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Abstract
This systemic risk paper introduces inhomogeneous random financial networks
(IRFNs). Such models are intended to describe parts, or the entirety, of a highly het-
erogeneous network of banks and their interconnections, in the global financial system.
Both the balance sheets and the stylized crisis behaviour of banks are ingredients of the
network model. A systemic crisis is pictured as triggered by a shock to banks’ balance
sheets, which then leads to the propagation of damaging shocks and the potential for
amplification of the crisis, ending with the system in a cascade equilibrium. Under
some conditions the model has “locally tree-like independence (LTI)”, where a general
percolation theoretic argument leads to an analytic fixed point equation describing
the cascade equilibrium when the number of banks N in the system is taken to infin-
ity. This paper focusses on mathematical properties of the framework in the context
of Eisenberg-Noe solvency cascades generalized to account for fractional bankruptcy
charges. New results including a definition and proof of the “LTI property” of the
Eisenberg-Noe solvency cascade mechanism lead to explicit N = ∞ fixed point equa-
tions that arise under very general model specifications. The essential formulas are
shown to be implementable via well-defined approximation schemes, but numerical ex-
ploration of some of the wide range of potential applications of the method is left for
future work.
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1 Introduction
Systemic risk (SR), the risk of large scale failure of the financial system as defined for example
in Schwarcz (2008), has long been understood (see e.g. Kaufman (1994)) to involve cascades
of contagious shocks of different types, notably funding liquidity shocks such as bank panics
and runs, and solvency shocks caused by failed banks. Compared to systems arising in other
areas of applied science, the financial system in question is extraordinarily complex in a
diversity of aspects. The agents or “nodes” will be thought of as banks in this paper, but
the picture can easily be extended to allow for different types of financial institutions, such
as firms, funds and households. The business and trading strategies of a single bank, itself
a complex hierarchical entity, are the result of decision making distributed across all the
subdivisions of the bank, and are often made under great uncertainty. The basic “links” or
“edges” of the system, representing exposures, are bi-directional connections between pairs of
banks. These change daily and are typically complex arrangements of financial contracts and
securities that reference many underlying financial and economic factors. Haldane (2009)
points out that the legal description of some individual contracts, such CDOs, may run to
thousands or millions of pages. The time scales relevant in banking range from microseconds
to decades. Banking systems in different countries are strongly linked. On top of this
intrinsic complexity, Corrigan (1982) describes how “banks are special”: They play a critical
systemic role at the heart of the much larger macroeconomy. To compound these difficulties,
essential systemic data, particularly disaggregated data with counterparty identification, if
it exists, is typically only available to regulators, not to observers or the banks themselves.
The system is intrinsically opaque.
A popular approach to understanding financial systemic risk, see Nier et al. (2007),
Gai and Kapadia (2010), Amini et al. (2016), Hurd (2016), Hurd (2018), has been to con-
struct random financial networks (RFNs), and to explore how different bank behaviour char-
acteristics lead to cascades and amplification of shocks. At the root of such network models
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is the choice of a random graph distribution to model the “skeleton graph” of interconnec-
tions between banks. Typically in these models, the edges in these graphs are directed,
by convention pointing from debtor to creditor bank. Some of the popular choices for the
skeleton have been directed configuration graphs and scale-free graphs. For example, directed
configuration graphs are constructed starting from a “degree distribution” that specifies the
number of in and out-edges for each node. So-called inhomogeneous random graphs (IRGs),
see Bolloba´s et al. (2007) and van der Hofstad (2016), are a related class that have been
introduced to systemic risk theory more recently in Detering et al. (2017) to capture the
diversity of bank sizes, connectivity and types better than the directed configuration graphs
normally assumed in this line of SR research.
The goal of this paper is to explore how inhomogeneous random financial networks
(IRFNs), in other words RFNs whose skeletons are IRGs, comprising a diverse collection of
bank types linked by random exposures, might behave when subjected to the types of crisis
triggers and contagion mechanisms often considered in the SR literature. A general category
of random financial networks will be introduced that consists of a connectivity “skeleton”
drawn from the broad class of inhomogeneous random graphs, on which is defined a random
collection of bank balance sheets and interbank exposures. Any large random shock that
hits the system is likely to trigger a cascade sequence of secondary shocks converging to a
cascade equilibrium that represents the final outcome of the crisis. This cascade mapping
results from the cascade mechanism that encodes the deterministic behavioural rules banks
are assumed to follow during the crisis.
IRFN models for any value of N can always be explored by pure simulation alone. Al-
ternatively, like configuration graphs, sequences of IRGs parametrized by increasing N can
be specified that have an important property called locally tree-like independence (LTI). As
described in Bordenave (2016) and others, this property implies that the random graph se-
quence is “locally weakly convergent” as N →∞ to a collection of connected Galton-Watson
random trees. The LTI property of IRGs implies for example that for any k > 1, the density
of cycles of length k in the graph goes to zero as N goes to infinity.
Amini et al. (2016) and Detering et al. (2017) have proven for certain simpler cascade
models on LTI sequences of random skeleton graphs that the large N asymptotics of the
cascade equilibrium is determined by a fixed point of a scalar-valued function, whose value
can be interpreted as an average default probability. The proof of such results typically
makes use of a combinatorial theorem of Wormald (1999), which is difficult to extend to the
more complex situations considered in the present paper. However, the result itself makes
intuitive sense in broader generality, because of two manifestations of the LTI property. First,
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the LTI property of the skeleton in these models implies it converges (in the “local weak”
sense) to a collection of random trees. Second, an analogous LTI property can be defined
for the cascade mapping itself, which has the meaning that a desired independence structure
is exact on all finite random trees. These two properties combined lead to the limiting
approximating cascade formulas and therefore it is not surprising that they are exact in
the infinite size limit. In general, based on the symmetries of the Galton-Watson skeleton,
these formulas can be shown to boil down to a fixed point equation for a monotonic function
of a particular collection of variables. It is has been observed in Melnik et al. (2011) that
such asymptotic formulas often seem to provide an “unreasonably effective approximation”
of finite sized systems studied by simulation. We will follow this common thread in the SR
literature, namely to determine the dependence on the number of banks N in the system, as
N →∞.
The main contributions of this paper are:
1. Introduction of the inhomogeneous random financial network (IRFN) framework, closely
related to the modelling framework of Detering et al. (2017) , that provides a flexible
and scalable architecture for modelling many of the complex network characteristics
thought to be relevant to systemic risk. In particular, we will develop solvency cascade
models for networks of banks with arbitrary types.
2. We present for the first time a cascade analysis for an economically important family of
models extending the EN 2001 framework to include partial fractional recovery of de-
faulted interbank assets. We also formulate and prove a “locally tree-like independence
property” for this class of solvency cascade mechanisms.
3. A general characterization is provided for the first cascade step in IRFN default models,
in the limit N →∞.
4. The large N asymptotics for full solvency cascades that arise in IRFN models is ex-
plored. Tractable recursive formulas for cascade equilibria are formulated and conjec-
tured to hold in the large N limit, based on the LTI property of both the IRFN itself
and the cascade mechanism.
The IRFN construction provides two specific benefits compared to the “configuration
graph” RFN constructions of Gai and Kapadia (2010) and Amini et al. (2016). Firstly, bank
type has a direct and basic financial interpretation: logically, a node’s degree is dependent on
its type. Type is a more intuitive and general notion than node degree, and better suited to
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SR modelling where edges and degrees are constantly changing while the type of node does
not change. Bank types can encode an unlimited range of node characteristics. Secondly,
bank type makes better financial sense than node degree as the conditioning random variables
determining system dependencies. In our setting, assuming random balance sheets and
exposures are independent conditioned on node types is better justified than assuming their
independence conditioned on node degrees.
The large N arguments developed in this paper can be used to investigate properties
that are likely to hold in a wide range of cascade models on large financial networks with
the assumed inhomogeneous random graph structure. Such models go far beyond the small
class of RFN models for which rigorous asymptotic results have been derived. The heuristic
arguments presented here, although conjectural, will complement a well-developed strand of
rigorous results in the literature surveyed by van der Hofstad (2016), that relate percolation
properties on random graphs to properties of branching processes. Thus this paper presents
a road map to developing rigorous percolation methods to prove the conjectures developed
in this paper.
Section 2 introduces the concept of inhomogeneous random financial networks (IRFNs).
Also included in the section are some of the probabilistic tools we will use in cascade anal-
ysis on an IRFN. Section 3 explores two of the important cascade channels treated in the
SR literature, namely solvency cascades and funding liquidity cascades, in terms of cascade
mechanisms that are deterministic rules of behaviour banks are assumed to follow during a
crisis. This section then focusses on the cascade mapping that results from a specific sol-
vency cascade mechanism operating within the IRFN model. Certain consequences of the
LTI property are demonstrated supporting the conjecture that some cascade models have a
tractable analytic asymptotic N = ∞ form. Section 4 provides a brief exploration of some
of the issues and the kind of data required to implement the IRFN cascade method for real
networks. Finally, a concluding section discusses some of the important questions and next
steps to address in order to better understand financial systemic risk.
Notation: For a positive integer N , [N ] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , N}. For a random
variable X , its cumulative distribution function (CDF), probability density function (PDF)
and characteristic function (CF) will be denoted FX , ρX = F
′
X , and fˆX respectively. For any
event A, 1(A) denotes the indicator random variable, taking values in {0, 1}. Any collection
of random variables X = (X1, X2, . . . ) generates a sigma-algebra (or informally “information
set”) denoted by σ(X). Landau’s “big O” notation f (N) = O(Nα) for some α ∈ R is used
for a sequence f (N), N = 1, 2, . . . to mean that f (N)N−α is bounded as N →∞.
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2 Defining IRFNs
The financial system at any moment in time will be represented by an object we call an
inhomogeneous random financial network, or IRFN. This is the specification of a multidi-
mensional random variable that captures two levels of structure. The primary level of the
IRFN, called the skeleton graph, is the directed random graph with N nodes, which from
now on we take to represent “banks”, and whose directed edges represent the existence of a
significant exposure of one bank to another. The secondary layer specifies the balance sheets
of the banks, including the inter-bank exposures, conditioned on knowledge of the skeleton
graph.
Inhomogeneity in the IRFN model derives from classifying banks by type. The collection
of random bank types {Tv}v∈[N ] will be assumed to completely determine the dependence
structure of other random variables. In other words, conditional expectations with respect
to the sigma-algebra σ(T ) := σ(Tv, v ∈ [N ]) will typically exhibit conditional independence.
2.1 Skeleton Graph
The skeleton graph is modelled as a directed inhomogeneous random graph (DIRG), general-
izing Erdo¨s-Renyi random graphs, in which directed edges are drawn independently between
ordered pairs of banks, not with equal likelihood but with likelihood that depends on the
bank types. This class has its origins in Chung and Lu (2002) and Britton et al. (2006) and
has been studied in generality in Bolloba´s et al. (2007). For further details about this class,
please see the textbooks van der Hofstad (2016) or Hurd (2016)[Section 3.4]. The DIRG
structure arises by the assumption that exposures between counterparties can be treated
as independent Bernoulli random variables Ivw defined for pairs of banks (v, w), with a
probability that depends on their types Tv, Tw.
Assumption 1 (Skeleton Graph). The primary layer of an IRFN, namely the skeleton graph
DIRG(P, κ, N), is a directed inhomogeneous random graph with N nodes labelled by v ∈ [N ].
It can be defined by two collections of random variables Tv, v ∈ [N ] and Ivw, v, w ∈ [N ], with
sigma-algebras σ(T ), σ(I) and σ(T, I) = σ(T ) ∨ σ(I).
1. Nodes: Each node, representing a bank, has type Tv ∈ T drawn independently with
probability P(T ) from a finite list of types T := [M ] of cardinality M ≥ 2.
2. Edges: Directed edges correspond to the non-zero entries of the incidence matrix I. For
each pair v 6= w ∈ [N ], Ivw is the indicator for w to be exposed to v, which is to say
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that v has borrowed from w. The collection of edge indicators Ivw is an independent
family of Bernoulli random variables, conditioned on the type vector T := (Tv)v∈[N ],
with probabilities
P[Ivw = 1 | σ(T )] := P[Ivw = 1 | Tv = T, Tw = T
′] = (N − 1)−1κ(T, T ′)1(v 6= w) . (1)
Here κ : [M ]2 → [0,∞), the probability mapping kernel, is assumed to be independent
of N . It determines the likelihood that two banks v, w of the given types have an exposure
edge from v to w. For consistency, we require that N − 1 ≥ maxT,T ′ κ(T, T
′).
2.2 Balance Sheets and the Crisis Trigger
The additional fundamental assumption of the IRFN modeling framework is that the balance
sheets for all banks are derivable from an independent collection of multivariate random
variables, conditioned on the skeleton. For the types of cascade analysis presented here,
balance sheets will be viewed at the coarse-grained resolution as shown in Table 1.
Assets Liabilities
inter-bank assets Z¯ inter-bank debt X¯
external illiquid assets A¯ external debt D¯
external liquid assets C¯, Ξ¯ equity E¯, ∆¯
Table 1: A stylized bank balance sheet.
Prior to the onset of the crisis, a bank v has a balance sheet that consists of nominal values
of assets and liabilities [Z¯, A¯, C¯, X¯, D¯, E¯] (labelled by barred quantities), which correspond to
the aggregated values of the contracts, valued as if all banks are solvent. Nominal values
can also be considered book values or face values. Assets (loans and securities) and liabilities
(debts) are decomposed into internal and external quantities depending on whether the
counterparty is a bank or not. The internal assets Z¯ and liabilities X¯ of the system can
be decomposed into the collection of nominal exposures Ω¯vw. Banks and institutions that
are not part of the system under analysis are deemed to be part of the exterior, and their
exposures are included as part of the external debts and assets. Finally, only two categories
of external assets are considered. Fixed assets model the retail loan book and realize only
a fraction of their value if liquidated prematurely while liquid assets include government
treasury bills and the like that are assumed to be as liquid as cash.
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Definition 1. The total nominal value of assets TAv of bank v prior to the crisis consists
of the nominal internal assets Z¯v, the nominal external illiquid assets A¯v, and the nominal
external liquid assets C¯v. The total nominal value of liabilities TLv of the bank consists of
the nominal internal debt X¯v, the nominal external debt D¯v and the bank’s nominal equity
E¯v. The nominal exposure of bank w to bank v is denoted by IvwΩ¯vw. All components of B¯
and Ω¯ are non-negative, and the accounting identities are satisfied:
Zv =
∑
w
IwvΩ¯wv, X¯v =
∑
w
IvwΩ¯vw,
∑
v
Z¯v =
∑
v
X¯v, Ω¯vv = 0 ,
TAv := Z¯v + A¯v + C¯v = X¯v + D¯v + E¯v =: TLv . (2)
The independent components of the nominal balance sheet will be denoted by B¯v = [A¯v, C¯v, E¯v].
A crisis trigger at a moment in time, which we label by step n = 0, occurs when a shock
δB = [δA, δC, δE] to the balance sheets is sufficiently severe to put some banks into a stressed
state where not all of their balance sheet entries B(0) = B¯ + δB are positive. For simplicity
we assume δΩ = 0,Ω(0) = Ω¯. To maintain the convention that balance sheet entries are
never negative, we introduce buffers in place of C¯, E¯. The cash buffer Ξ
(0)
v := C¯v + δCv may
be negative, in which case the bank v is said to be illiquid. Similarly, the solvency buffer
∆
(0)
v := E¯v + δEv may now be negative, in which case the bank is said to be insolvent or,
equivalently, bankrupt. In our general systemic risk modelling paradigm, the cascade that
follows the crisis trigger will be viewed for n ≥ 0 as a step-wise dynamics for the collection
of balance sheets B
(n)
v of the entire system as it tries to resolve these illiquid and insolvent
banks.
Now we make some pragmatic probabilistic assumptions about the initial balance sheet
and exposure random variables at n = 0, conditioned on the vector of bank types T =
(Tv)v∈[N ]. Let us denote by σ(T ) the sigma-algebra generated by T .
Assumption 2 (Balance Sheets and Exposures). The secondary layer of an IRFN, the
collection of initial balance sheets and exposures B
(0)
v , Ω¯vw at step n = 0, are continuous
random variables that are mutually independent, and independent of σ(I), conditioned on
σ(T ).
1. For each bank v, the marginal CDF of B
(0)
v = [A
(0)
v ,Ξ
(0)
v ,∆
(0)
v ] conditioned on σ(T ) is
an increasing continuous function of x ∈ R+×R
2 taking values in [0, 1] and depending
only on Tv ∈ [M ]:
FB(x | Tv) := P(B
(0)
v ≤ x | σ(T )) . (3)
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Note that A
(0)
v is a positive random variable whereas the buffers may be negative. The
initially illiquid banks are those with Ξ
(0)
v < 0 and initially insolvent banks are those
with ∆
(0)
v < 0.
2. For each edge vw, the marginal CDF of Ω¯vw conditioned on σ(T ) is an increasing
function on R+ = [0,∞) depending only on Tv, Tw ∈ [M ]:
FΩ(x | Tv, Tw) := P(Ω¯vw ≤ x | σ(T )) , (4)
such that
FΩ(0 | Tv, Tw) = 0, lim
x→∞
FΩ(x | Tv, Tw) = 1 .
In summary, a finite IRFN representing the system after a crisis trigger amounts to a
collection of random variables (T, I,B(0), Ω¯) satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2.
2.3 Asymptotic Properties of IRFNs
2.3.1 Degree Distribution of the Skeleton Graph
One is often concerned with the number of counterparties of nodes in directed random
graphs, in other words, the in- and out-degree distributions. In DIRG networks, the degree
distributions have a natural Poisson mixture structure in the large N limit. By permutation
symmetry, we need only consider bank 1 with arbitrary type T1 = T , whose in/out degree is
defined as the pair (d−1 , d
+
1 ) =
∑N
w=2(Iw1, I1w), a sum of conditionally IID bivariate random
variables. Each term has the identical bivariate conditional characteristic function
E
(N)[eik1Iw1eik2I1w | T1 = T ] =
∑
T ′∈[M ]
P(T ′)
(
1 + (N − 1)−1κ(T, T ′)(eik1 − 1)
)
×
(
1 + (N − 1)−1κ(T ′, T )(eik2 − 1)
)
.
The conditional CF of (d−1 , d
+
1 ) is the N − 1 power of this function, and dropping higher
order terms in N−1 this can be written
E
(N)[eik1d
−
1 +ik2d
+
1 | T ] = (5)[
1 +
1
N − 1
∑
T ′
P(T ′)
(
κ(T, T ′)(eik1 − 1) + κ(T ′, T )(eik2 − 1)
)
+O(N−1)
]N−1
,
which displays simple asymptotic structure as N →∞.
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Proposition 1. The characteristic function of the joint in/out degree (d−v , d
+
v ) of a bank v,
conditioned on its bank-type T ∈ [M ], is 2pi-biperiodic on R2 and has the N → ∞ limiting
behaviour:
fˆ (N)(k1, k2 | T ) = fˆ(k1, k2 | T )
(
1 +O(N−1)
)
, (6)
fˆ(k1, k2 | T ) := exp
[
λ−(T )(eik1 − 1) + λ+(T )(eik2 − 1)
]
,
where λ+(T ) =
∑
T ′ P(T
′)κ(T ′, T ), λ−(T ) =
∑
T ′ P(T
′)κ(T, T ′). Here, convergence of the
logarithm of (6) is in L2([0, 2pi]× [0, 2pi]).
This type of limit can be handled by the following technical lemma, proved in the Ap-
pendix.
Lemma 2. Let y¯ > 0 and I be any hyperinterval in Rd. Suppose g(x, y) : I × [0, y¯] → C is
a bivariate function such that g(·, y), ∂yg(·, y), ∂
2
yg(·, y) are pointwise bounded and in L
2(I)
for each value y ∈ [0, y¯]. Then
lim
y→0
||
1
y
log(1 + yg(x, y))]− g(x, 0)||L2 = O(y) .
Proof. (Proposition 2) Apply Lemma 2 to log
(
E
(N)[eik1d
−
1 +ik2d
+
1 | T ]
)
for each T with N−1 =
y−1 and
g(k1, k2, y) =
∑
T ′∈[M ]
P(T ′)
[
κ(T, T ′)(eik1 − 1) + κ(T ′, T )(eik2 − 1)
+yκ(T, T ′)(eik1 − 1)κ(T ′, T )(eik2 − 1)
]
.
⊓⊔
Thus, for different values of T , the conditional joint in/out degree distribution is always
asymptotic to a bivariate Poisson distribution. Now, recall that a finite mixture of a collection
of probability distribution functions is the probability formed by a convex combination.
We can then see that under our simplification of a finite type space [M ], the asymptotic
unconditional in/out degree distribution of any bank is a finite mixture:
fˆ (N)(k1, k2) =
∑
T
P(T )fˆ (N)(k1, k2 | T ) ,
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where each component has a bivariate Poisson distribution with Poisson parameters(∑
T ′
P(T ′)κ(T ′, T ),
∑
T ′
P(T ′)κ(T, Tw)
)
.
The mixing variable is the bank-type T , with the mixing weights P(T ).
Proposition 1 is a manifestation of the locally tree-like property of IRFNs. Consider the
limiting distribution of the interbank debt X¯1 =
∑
w 6=1 Ω¯w1 of a typical bank v = 1.
Proposition 3. 1. The characteristic function of the interbank debt X¯1 of bank 1, con-
ditioned on its bank-type T ∈ [M ], has the N →∞ limiting behaviour:
fˆ
(N)
X (k | T ) := E
(N)
[∏
w 6=1
eikIw1Ω¯w1 | T
]
= fˆX(k | T )(1 +O(N
−1)) (7)
fˆX(k | T ) = exp
[∑
T ′
P(T ′)κ(T ′, T )(fˆΩ¯(k | T
′, T )− 1)
]
(8)
where convergence of the logarithm of (7) is in L2[0,∞).
2. Any finite collection of interbank debt random variables {X¯v, v ∈ [1, 2, . . . , P ]} is inde-
pendent in the N →∞ limit.
Proof. By the conditional independence of the factors, we have an exact formula valid for
finite N :
fˆ
(N)
X (k | T ) =
∏
w 6=1
E
(N)[1 + Iw1(e
ikΩ¯w1 − 1) | T ] (9)
=
(
1 +
∑
T ′
P(T ′)
κ(T ′, T )
N − 1
(
fˆΩ(k | T
′, T )− 1
))N−1
Now, by applying Lemma 2 to log fˆ
(N)
X with N − 1 = y
−1 and
g(k, y) =
∑
T ′ P(T
′)κ(T ′, T )(fˆΩ(k | T
′, T )− 1), the limit in L2[0,∞) is
log fˆ
(N)
X (k | T ) = log fˆX(k | T ) +O(N
−1)
where fˆX(k | T ) is as stated above. ⊓⊔
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Remark 1. Comparison of equation (8) to the Le´vy-Khintchin formula shows that X¯ is a
positive compound Poisson random variable with a continuous jump measure dµX(· | T ) on
R+:
fˆX(k | T ) = exp
[∫ ∞
0
[eiku − 1]µX(u | T )du
]
, (10)
µX(u | T ) =
∑
T ′
P(T ′) κ(T ′, T ) ρΩ(u | T
′, T ) . (11)
It follows that the unconditional distribution of X¯v is a mixture over Tv of compound Poisson
random variables, with mixing distribution P(Tv), including a positive probability∑
T P(T )e
−
∫
∞
0 µX(u|T )du for X = 0.
For part (2), note that the same proof implies that the joint conditional CF of X¯1, X¯2
two banks will be given by
E
(N)(eik1X¯1eik2X¯2 | T1, T2) = fˆ
(N)
X (k1 | T1)fˆ
(N)
X (k2 | T2)
(
1 +O(N−1)
)
.
Similarly, for the joint conditional CF for any finite collection of banks.
2.4 The Galton-Watson Process
The result in Proposition 2 on the large N asymptotic degree distribution reflects the general
principle discussed in Bordenave (2016) that a sequence of locally tree-like networks such as
an IRG is always “locally weakly convergent” to a collection of connected Galton-Watson
(GW) random trees. This has a well-defined meaning that the collection of nodes that can
be reached from a given node of type T by following directed edges has the approximate
structure of a branching process. We can interpret Proposition 2 as implying that the number
of nodes of type T ′ that can be reached along single directed edges rooted at any node v
with type T is a Poisson random variable XT ′,T with mean parameter P(T
′)κ(T, T ′). Each
subsequent one-step extension has the same underlying distribution, defining the branching
process. These facts identify the offspring distribution of any node, conditioned on its type.
It is not hard to deduce that Zn,T ′,T , the number of n step directed paths rooted at the
node v = 1 with type T and terminating in a node of type T ′, is a random variable that will
follow the recursion formula
Zn,T ′,T =
∑
T ′′∈[M ]
Zn−1,T ′′,T∑
i=1
XT ′,T ′′,i , n > 1 (12)
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with Z1,T ′,T ∼ XT ′,T,1. Here {Zn−1,T ′′,T , XT ′,T ′′,i}i∈Z+ is a mutually independent collection of
random variables and each XT ′′,T,i is identically Pois(P(T
′′)κ(T, T ′′)).
We now provide a multi-type extension of the discussion of branching processes found
in Hurd (2016)[Section 4.1]. Let G = (G1, . . . , GM) : [0, 1]
M → [0, 1]M denote the following
probability generating function for the identically distributed multi-variate random variables
XT ′,T,i: for a = (a1, . . . , aM) and T ∈ [M ] the T -component of G is defined to be
GT (a) = E
M∏
T ′=1
(aT ′)
XT ′,T = exp[
∑
T ′
P(T ′)κ(T, T ′)(aT ′ − 1)]. (13)
From the GW recursion (12), one can verify that the probability generating functions Hn =
(Hn,1, . . . , Hn,M) : [0, 1]
M → [0, 1]M for the multi-variate random variables Zn,T ′,T defined by
Hn,T (a) = E
M∏
T ′=1
(aT ′)
Zn,T ′,T (14)
are given by the composition
Hn = Hn−1 ◦G = G ◦G · · · ◦G︸ ︷︷ ︸
n factors
. (15)
The extinction probabilities for this GW process forms a vector ξ = (ξT )T∈[M ] where
ξT := P[ ∃ n : Zn,T ′,T = 0 ∀ T
′]. For each n, define ξn,T = P[Zn,T ′,T = 0 ∀ T
′] = Hn,T (0).
Since Zn−1,T ′,T = 0 ∀ T
′, T implies Zn,T ′,T = 0 ∀ T
′, T , the sequence ξn = (ξn,1, ξn,M) is
increasing, bounded and therefore converges to some value ξ ∈ [0, 1]M . Since ξn = Hn(0),
ξn = G(Hn−1(0)) = G(ξn−1) .
Note also that G has G(1) = 1 and is continuous and increasing on [0, 1]M . Therefore, by
continuity,
ξ = lim
n→∞
ξn = lim
n→∞
G(ξn−1) = G
(
lim
n→∞
ξn−1
)
= G(ξ) ,
so ξ ∈ [0, 1]M is a fixed point, which we can also see is the least fixed point, of G. Since
G is strictly convex everywhere, it can have at most two fixed points on the lattice [0, 1]M .
From this discussion, one can deduce that a node with type T will have an infinite number
of nodes in its forward cluster with probability 1− ξT , which will be non-zero for some T if
the gradient ∇G at ξ = 1 has its maximal eigenvalue greater than 1.
This recaps the main result of percolation theory that the existence or not of an infinite
connected cluster is directly related to whether or not the extinction probability vector is ξ <
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1 or not. Since ξ is the least fixed point of G, this amounts to the existence or not of a non-
trivial fixed point of the analytic function G : [0, 1]M → [0, 1]M . Our object now is to define
how financial crises can be modelled as cascades on random financial networks. Percolation
theory, as an abstract exploration of network connectivity, is a guide to understanding the
susceptibility of such financial networks to cascades.
3 Default Cascades on IRFNs
The IRFN framework specifies the distributions of the random variables T, I, B¯, Ω¯ just in-
troduced. It provides a compact stochastic representation of the state of a given real world
network of N banks at a moment in time prior to a crisis. With the same distributional
data, we can consider this as an element of a sequence of networks by varying N and taking
N → ∞. We now want to consider how such networks will respond when a trigger event
at time t = 0 moves the pre-trigger balance sheets B¯ = [A¯, Ξ¯, ∆¯] to the post-trigger balance
sheets B(0) = B¯ + δB (recall we assume Ω(0) = Ω¯).
Cascade mechanisms (CMs) are stylized behaviours that banks are assumed to follow
when they become aware that a crisis has been triggered. These behaviours are highly non-
linear, to reflect that during a crisis banks will take emergency or remedial actions, and in the
worst case of bankruptcy be taken over by a system regulator. “Business as usual”, in which
banks react smoothly to small changes as they pursue profits, is not applicable during the
crisis. Instead we assume healthy banks that are solvent and liquid adopt a “do nothing/wait
and see” crisis management strategy, while weak banks’ behaviour may be forced or severely
constrained by the regulatory structure. From a systemic perspective, cascades can arise
when weak banks’ behaviour have negative impact on other banks.
Hurd (2018) provides an overview of some of the important cascade channels that model
the forced behaviour of banks when their buffers fall below certain thresholds. For example,
funding liquidity cascades arise when banks experience withdrawals by depositors or wholesale
lenders. After n steps of the cascade their impacted cash buffers will be Ξ
(n)
v = Ξ
(0)
v −∑
w S˜
(n−1)
wv where S˜
(n−1)
wv denotes the liquidity shock transmitted from bank w hitting bank
v. This section focuses instead on solvency cascades, which turn out to have the same
mathematical structure as funding liquidity cascades. In this channel the most relevant
buffer variable is the impacted solvency buffer after n cascade steps ∆
(n)
v = ∆
(0)
v −
∑
w S
(n−1)
wv ,
where S
(n−1)
wv denotes the solvency shock from w to v.
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3.1 Default Cascade Mechanisms
We now consider a class of models generalizing the clearing model for defaulted debt of
Eisenberg and Noe (2001). The original EN model assumes that no bankruptcy charges are
paid when a firm defaults, ruling out a dangerous contagion amplification mechanism. More
realistically, bankruptcy charges and frictions will likely amount to a substantial effective
cut of the firm’s value at its default. Rogers and Veraart (2013) extend the EN model in this
direction by assuming that bankruptcy costs given default are linear in the endowment and
the recovery value of interbank assets. In their model, the recovery value is discontinuous in
buffer variables at the solvency threshold, creating an effectively infinite shock amplification
effect at this “hard threshold”. In contrast, we make a “soft threshold” assumption where
the recovery fraction on interbank debt is a continuous piecewise linear function of the level
of insolvency.
Partial recovery of the notional value of the defaulted bank’s assets will therefore be
assumed to be distributed amongst creditors according to their seniority. Banks are assumed
to have balance sheets as in Table 1, and to be insolvent (bankrupt) if and only if ∆ < 0.
Assumption 3 (Fractional Recovery). For each bank,
1. External debt D is senior to interbank debt X and all interbank debt is of equal seniority;
2. Bankruptcy charges are in proportion to the negative part of the impacted solvency
buffer.
Thus there is a fixed parameter λ ∈ (0, 1] assumed to be the same for all banks, such
that at step n of the cascade
bankruptcy costs = (1/λ− 1)max(−∆(n), 0) . (16)
This assumption implies that the amount available to repay all debtors of a defaulted firm is
TA− (1/λ− 1)max(−∆(n), 0). It means that as soon as ∆
(n)
v ≤ −λX¯v, the recovery fraction
paid on defaulted interbank debt will be zero.
In general, the loss fraction on interbank debt of each bank at step n can be identified as
the insolvency level random variable defined by
D(n)v = gλ
(
∆
(n)
v
X¯v
)
, gλ(x) := min (1,max(−x/λ, 0)) . (17)
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The insolvency level of bank w at step n now influences the solvency shock transmitted to
another bank v:
S(n)wv := IwvΩ¯wvD
(n)
w , (18)
the aggregated solvency shock transmitted to v:
S(n)v :=
∑
w 6=v
S(n)wv , (19)
and finally, the solvency buffer of v at the end of step n:
∆(n+1)v = ∆
(0)
v −
∑
w
S(n)wv . (20)
Putting (17, 18, 19, 20) together gives the complete solvency cascade mapping at step n ≥ 0.
3.2 The First Cascade Step
Consider (18) for n = 0 defining the single shock S
(0)
21 = I21Ω¯21D
(0)
2 transmitted from 2 to 1
for two typical banks 1, 2. Then S
(0)
21 = Gλ(X, Y, Z) where the shock transmission function
Gλ(x, y, z) = zgλ(y/(x+ z)), gλ(u) = min(1,max(−u/λ, 0)) . (21)
depends on the independent random variables X = X2\1 :=
∑
w 6=1,2 I2wΩ¯2w, Y := ∆
(0)
2 , Z :=
I21Ω¯21. The next proposition shows that the characteristic function of S
(0)
21 for finite N can
be expressed in terms of
R(N)(k, k′ | T, T ′) :=
1
2pi
∫ 0
−∞
eik
′y
E
(N)[eikGλ(X,Y,Ω¯21) − 1 | Y = y, T1 = T, T2 = T
′] dy , (22)
the Fourier transform of the conditional characteristic function of a particular random vari-
able related to S
(0)
21 .
Proposition 4. The characteristic function of the solvency shock S
(0)
21 transmitted from bank
2 to bank 1 in step 0, conditioned on the types T1 = T, T2 = T
′, is given for finite N by
E
(N)[eikS
(0)
21 | T, T ′] = 1 +
κ(T ′, T )
N − 1
∫ ∞
−∞
fˆ
(0)
∆ (k
′ | T ′) R(N)(k, k′ | T, T ′) dk′ . (23)
Proof. The proof works for any bounded shock transmission functionG such thatG(x, y, 0) =
0 andG(x, y, z)1(y ≥ 0) = 0. Since eikG(X,Y,I21Ω¯21) = 1+I21(e
ikG(X,Y,Ω¯21)−1) and (eikG(X,Y,Ω¯21)−
1)1(Y ≥ 0) = 0,
E
(N)[eikS
(0)
21 | T, T ′] = 1 + E(N)[I21(e
ikG(X,Y,Ω¯21) − 1) 1(Y < 0) | T, T ′]
= 1 +
κ(T ′, T )
N − 1
∫ 0
−∞
ρ
(0)
∆ (y|T
′)E(N)[eikG(X,Y,Ω¯21) − 1 | Y = y, T, T ′] dy
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which by (22) and the Parseval-Plancherel identity in Fourier analysis yields the required
result (23). ⊓⊔
While the proposition provides an abstract characterization of the result for general shock
transmission functions G(X, Y, Z), we will also need explicit integral formulas for the specific
function Gλ given by (21). Fix a = −y/λ and define
R(N)(k, a) := E(N)[eikGλ(X,Y,Ω¯21) − 1 | Y = −aλ, T, T ′] ,
and note that R(N)(k, a) = 0 for a ≤ 0. For a > 0, taking into account that P(N)(X = 0) 6= 0,
we can write
R(N)(k, a) = P(N)(X = 0)
∫
R+
ρΩ(z)(e
ikGλ(0,−aλ,z) − 1) dz
+
∫∫
R2+
ρ
(N)
X (x)ρΩ(z)(e
ikGλ(x,−aλ,z) − 1) dx dz
where
∫
R+
ρ
(N)
X (x)dx = 1 − P
(N)(X = 0). In the double integral we change integration
variables to (x, u) ∈ R+ × [0, a]. This has the inverse transformation
(x, z) =
(
x, u1(x ≤ a− u) +
ux
a− u
1(x > a− u)
)
.
After some manipulation, this gives the formula
R(N)(k, a) = P(N)(X = 0)P(Ω¯21 > a)(e
ika − 1)
+
∫ a
0
P
(N)(X ∈ [0, a− u))ρΩ(u)(e
iku − 1) du
+
∫ a
0
[∫ ∞
a−u
ρΩ
( ux
a− u
) ax
(a− u)2
ρ
(N)
X (x) dx
]
(eiku − 1) du . (24)
Finally, we note that the distribution of X = X2\1 for any N can be computed using
Proposition 3 with a replacement of N by N−1, which leads to an explicit multi-dimensional
integral for R(N)(k, k′ | T, T ′).
We next consider the asymptotic distribution of the total solvency shock S
(0)
1 :=
∑
w 6=1 S
(0)
w1
transmitted to bank 1 in step 0. By a slight generalization of Lemma 2, one can argue
that any finite collection of shocks {S
(0)
w1}w 6=1 are identical, and asymptotically independent,
conditioned on the type T1 = T . However, this fact cannot prove the following plausible
17
statement:
E
(N)[eikS
(0)
1 | T ] = E(N)
[∏
w 6=1
eikS
(0)
w1 | T
]
∼
∏
w 6=1
E
(N)[eikS
(0)
w1 | T ](1 +O(N−1)) =
(∑
T ′
P(T ′)E(N)[eikS
(0)
21 | T, T ′]
)N−1
(1 +O(N−1))
where ∼ represents the unproven step. Accepting this unproven step as true, and following
the argument proving Proposition 1 leads to the following conjecture:
Conjecture 5. The characteristic function of the total solvency shock S
(0)
1 =
∑
w 6=1 S
(0)
w1
transmitted to bank 1 in step 0, conditioned on the type T1 = T , has the N → ∞ limiting
behaviour:
E
(N)[eikS
(0)
1 | T ] = fˆ
(0)
S (k | T )(1 +O(N
−1)) , (25)
fˆ
(0)
S (k | T ) := exp
(∑
T ′
P(T ′)κ(T ′, T )
∫ ∞
−∞
fˆ
(0)
∆ (k
′ | T ′) R(k, k′ | T, T ′) dk′
)
where the limit of the logarithm is in L2[0,∞). Here
R(k, k′ | T, T ′) :=
1
2pi
∫ 0
−∞
eik
′yR(k,−y/λ) dy
where R(k, a) is given by (24) with N =∞ and the conditions T, T ′.
An interpretation of this conjecture based on the formula (24) is that the solvency shock
hitting bank v = 1 in step 0 is a non-negative Le´vy distributed random variable. Moreover,
the jump measure is a specific non-linear convolution of the three component probability
density functions.
On the right side of equation (20) for the impacted default buffer ∆
(1)
1 = ∆
(0)
1 − S
(0)
1 at
the end of step 0 we see directly that S
(0)
1 and ∆
(0)
1 share no common balance sheet random
variables, and are therefore independent conditionally on the type T of bank 1. From the
multiplicative property of characteristic functions of sums of independent random variables,
the impacted default buffer ∆
(1)
1 has the product conditional characteristic function
fˆ
(1)
∆ (k | T ) = fˆ
(0)
∆ (k | T )fˆ
(0)
S (−k | T ) . (26)
In summary, step 0 of the solvency cascade mapping has been broken down into three
substeps that capture the probabilistic implications of equations (18)-(20). Each of these sub-
steps depends on the initial conditional distributional data for the collection {Tv, Ivw, Ω¯vw,∆
(0)
v },
combined with a conditional independence assumption. The result of the mapping is full
conditional univariate distributional data for the collection {∆
(1)
v }.
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3.3 LTI Cascade Mechanisms
It turns out that Conjecture 5 is understandable from a different perspective if we consider
the solvency cascade mapping on an IRFN, under the condition that the skeleton graph is a
non-random, connected, directed tree. This alternative line of thinking is motivated because
the skeleton of an IRFN is an IRG, which we have observed will always converge “locally
weakly” to a random ensemble of connected components which are trees. We will now prove
that the solvency cascade mapping on a skeleton which is a non-random, connected, directed
tree has a nice property we call locally tree-like independent.
Let ([N ], E) denote the nodes and edges of such a tree skeleton, with node types labelled.
Being a connected, directed tree, there is a partial ordering ≥, > generated by the relation-
ships w > (wv) > v whenever (wv) ∈ E . Every element of ([N ], E) is connected to a fixed
node w by a unique path, whose final edge is either into or out of w. For any collection A of
nodes and edges, we denote by σ(A) the sigma-algebra generated by the collection of random
variables {∆
(0)
u , Ω¯wv}u,(wv)∈A. When ([N ], E) arises from an IRFN on a tree, this is always a
mutually independent collection. If A,B are disjoint subsets, then σ(A) and σ(B) are always
independent. Now, for each u ∈ [N ] and (wv) ∈ E we define some natural collections of
random variables and their sigma-algebras.
1. M−u : the subset of ([N ], E) whose elements are each connected to u by a path whose
final edge is directed into u.
2. M+u : the subset of ([N ], E) whose elements are each connected to u by a path whose
final edge is directed out of u.
3. M−
v\w: the subset of ([N ], E) whose elements are each connected to v by a path whose
final edge is directed into v, but is not the edge (wv).
4. M+
w\v: the subset of ([N ], E) whose elements are each connected to w by a path whose
final edge is directed out of w, but is not the edge (wv).
Note that the following are disjoint unions for all u ∈ [N ], (wv) ∈ E :
[N ] ∪ E =M−u ∪M
+
u ∪ {u} ; M
−
v =M
−
v\w ∪ {(wv)} ∪ {w} ∪M
+
w\v ∪M
−
w . (27)
Definition 2. A solvency cascade mechanism has the locally tree-like independent property
if, conditioned on the skeleton being a non-random, connected, directed tree, ∆
(n)
v is σ(M−v ∪
{v})-measurable for all n ≥ 0 and v ∈ [N ].
19
Based on the independence of σ(A) and σ(B) whenever A,B are disjoint subsets, we can
prove the LTI property of the EN solvency cascade mechanism with fractional recovery.
Proposition 6. (LTI property of the solvency cascade mechanism) Consider an IRFN con-
ditioned on a skeleton graph ([N ], E) (or equivalently the realized random variables T, I) that
is a non-random, connected, directed tree. Then the solvency cascade defined by (18)-(20)
for any parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] is such that for all n ≥ 0 and (wv) ∈ E ,
1. ∆
(n)
v is σ(M−v ∪ {v})-measurable.
2. S
(n)
wv is σ(M−w ∪M
+
w\v ∪ {w} ∪ {(wv)})-measurable.
3. S
(n)
v is σ(M−v )-measurable.
Proof. First we note that for any (wv) ∈ E , X¯w\v is M
+
w\v-measurable. Next note that ∆
(0)
v
is σ({v})-measurable. Now assume inductively that ∆
(n)
v is σ(M−v ∪ {v})-measurable for
n = k and all v. Then it follows that
1. For any (wv) ∈ E , S
(k)
wv = Gλ(X¯w\v,∆
(k)
w , Ω¯wv) which is σ(M
+
w\v∪M
−
w ∪{w}∪{(wv)})-
measurable, and hence σ(M−v )-measurable by (27).
2. S
(k)
v =
∑
{w:(wv)∈E} S
(k)
wv is σ(M−v )-measurable.
3. ∆
(k+1)
v = ∆
(0)
v − S
(k)
v is σ(M−v ∪ {v})-measurable.
This verifies the inductive step for n = k + 1, and hence the proposition is proven for all
n ≥ 0. ⊓⊔
This proposition unravels the independence relationships across the entire family of bal-
ance sheet and exposure random variables that arise as the solvency cascade mapping is
iterated. When the LTI property of the solvency cascade mechanism is combined with the
fact that the infinite skeleton of an IRFN has components that are all random trees, it is
not at all surprising that the large-N asymptotics of the cascade mapping is consistent with
Conjecture 5. Moreover, since the LTI property extends for any finite number of cascade
steps, we have confidence to the extend the conjecture to all higher orders in the cascade.
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3.4 Higher Order Cascade Steps
The proposed solvency cascade dynamics is given by iterates n = 0, 1, 2, . . . of the mapping
from ∆(0) to ∆(1) defined above, assuming the conjectured N = ∞ asymptotic approxima-
tion. This dynamics will take the probability distribution data for the collection {∆
(n)
v } to
probability distribution data for the collection {∆
(n+1)
v }. Given the distributional data for
the collection {Tv, Ivw, Ω¯vw,∆
(n)
v }, step n of the full cascade is therefore generated by the
following algorithm.
Cascade Mapping:
1. To compute the univariate CF fˆ
(n)
S (k | T ) of the total solvency shock S
(n)
1 , use (25)
with fˆ
(0)
∆ replaced by fˆ
(n)
∆ :
E[eikS
(n)
1 | T ] = exp
(∑
T ′
P(T ′)κ(T ′, T )
∫ ∞
−∞
fˆ
(n)
∆ (k
′ | T ′) R(k, k′ | T, T ′) dk′
)
(28)
2. To compute the univariate distribution of the impacted default buffer ∆
(n+1)
1 = ∆
(0)
1 −
S
(n)
1 use the formula (26):
fˆ
(n+1)
∆ (k | T ) = fˆ
(0)
∆ (k | T )fˆ
(n)
S (−k | T ) . (29)
3.5 Cascade Steps: Algorithmic Complexity
A numerical implemention of the cascade mapping just described will require suitable trun-
cation and discretization to approximate the integrals in (28) by finite sums. In other words,
we need to find a suitable truncation parameter L and discretization parameter δ such that
computing the function R(k, k′ | T, T ′) = P(T ′)κ(T ′, T )R(k, k′ | T, T ′) for k, k′ on the grid
Γ = δ{−L + 1/2,−L+ 3/2, . . . , L− 3/2, L− 1/2}2 ⊂ R2 provides sufficient accuracy. Note
that R, a square matrix with 2L × M rows and columns, is only computed once for the
entire cascade.
Given R, the algorithm for each cascade step maps the 2L × M dimensional vector
fˆ
(n)
∆ to the exponential of a matrix product fˆ
(n)
S = exp[R ∗ fˆ
(n)
∆ ], followed by a Hadamard
(element-wise) product fˆ
(n+1)
∆ = diag(fˆ
(0)
∆ ) ∗ fˆ
(n)
S .
Thus the solvency cascade mapping admits a very compact specification in terms of the
sequence of conditional characteristic functions, taken as vectors fˆ
(n)
∆ := f
(n) ∈ C2L×M ,
namely:
f (n+1) = C(f (n)) := diag(f (0)) ∗ exp[R ∗ f (n)] . (30)
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The nonlinear mapping C : C2L×M → C2L×M is parametrized by the solvency cascade kernel
R and the default buffer distribution f (0), which, we can also note, must satisfy complex
conjugation identities R(k, k′) = R(−k,−k′) and f (0)(k) = f (0)(−k). A single cascade step
is thus of order O(L2 × M2) flops plus 2L × M ordinary exponentiations. In general, a
cascade equilibrium is a fixed point f∗ of the mapping,
f∗ = diag(f (0)) ∗ exp[R ∗ f∗] .
4 Implementing IRFNs
Consider a generic banking network for some country that consists of Nˆ =
∑
T∈[M ] NˆT banks
classified into M types labelled by T ∈ [M ], where NˆT denotes the number of banks of type
T . Suppose the interconnectivity, exposures and balance sheets of the network have been
observed monthly for the past Nm = 12 months. Bank type can be assumed not to change,
but the connectivity and balance sheets will fluctuate over the period. The aim here is to
construct a sequence of IRFNs of size N increasing to infinity, that is statistically consistent
with the real world pre-crisis financial network when N = Nˆ . Then the statistical model for
N =∞ can be subjected to crisis triggers with any type of initial shock δB, and the resultant
solvency cascade analytics developed in Section 3 will yield measures of the resilience of the
real world network.
For any of the monthly observations of the network, directed edges are drawn between
any ordered pair (v, w) of banks if the exposure of bank w to bank v exceeds a specified
threshold (a “significant exposure”). Let Eˆ =
∑
T,T ′ EˆT,T ′ be the total number of significant
exposures in the network identified in the Nm = 12 month historical database, decomposed
into a sum over the bank types involved. For each T → T ′ edge e ∈ [EˆT,T ′] we observe the
value Ωe; For each v ∈ [Nm × NˆT ] we also observe samples Bv of the type T balance sheets.
Our large N IRFN will be calibrated to this data.
4.1 Calibrating the Large N Model
The data described above leads to a natural calibration of the pre-trigger IRFN model for
any value of N (including N = ∞) at any time in the near future. A bank v randomly
selected from the empirical distribution will have type T with probability
P̂(T ) =
NˆT
Nˆ
.
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Conditioned on Tv = T , its balance sheet Bv = [A¯v, Ξ¯v, ∆¯v] will be drawn from the distribu-
tion whose empirical characteristic function is
fˆB(u | T ) =
1
Nm × NˆT
Nm×NˆT∑
v=1
eiu·Bv (31)
as a function of u ∈ R3+.
A randomly selected pair of banks e = (v, w), v 6= w with types T, T ′ respectively will
have a significant directed exposure, and hence a directed edge, with probability
κ̂(T, T ′) =
EˆT,T ′
NmNˆT (NˆT ′ − δTT ′)
.
where the matrix κ̂ is called the empirical connection kernel. Finally, for each ordered pair
T, T ′ we have EˆT,T ′ observed significant exposures Ωe from a T bank to a T
′ bank, leading
to the empirical characteristic function
fˆΩ(u | T, T
′) =
1
EˆT,T ′
EˆT,T ′∑
e=1
eiuΩe . (32)
Solvency cascade computations involve integrals over the u-variables, which must be
approximated by finite sums obtained by truncation and discretization. This will lead essen-
tially to the Fast Fourier Transform, which amounts to choosing a suitably small discretiza-
tion parameter δ and large truncation value δL and computing each occurrence of (32) for
the finite lattice u ∈ δ{−L+ 1/2,−L+ 3/2, . . . , L− 3/2, L− 1/2}.
The increasing sequence of random IRFN models based on these empirical probability
distributions is intended to capture essential aspects of systemic risk in our specific finite
real world network. For this to be true, a necessary condition to be verified will be that the
N =∞ solvency cascade analytics should also provide a reasonably accurate approximation
to simulation results for finite N .
4.2 Parametrization Issues
There are several issues that need to be addressed by extensive experimentation when im-
plementing such a scheme.
1. Network sparsity: What is the best threshold for defining “significant exposures”?
There is a tradeoff between increasing the connectivity (reducing sparseness) and the
cost of ignoring small exposures: It has been argued that only “large exposures” are
important in SR. Computational burden is not sensitive to the exposure threshold.
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2. How many types of banks is ideal? Again, there is a tradeoff. Taking M sufficiently
large is important because this is the parameter that determines how realistically the
network correlation can be modelled. However, note that the computational burden
increases and the power of the statistical estimation decreases with the number of
types.
3. How large must N be chosen so that the asymptotic analysis is a good approximation?
Likely, the accuracy of the large N approximation will deteriorate as the number of
types increases. How sensitive is the accuracy of the LTI approximation (which relies
to some extent on the sparsity of the network) to the choice of exposure threshold?
4. Where can one obtain the data required to calibrate IRFN models? Exposure data with
identified counterparties is never publicly available, and currently is often not available
even to regulators. So finding real world network data is a serious impediment to
implementing any kind of financial network model.
4.3 Numerical Experiments
We have described how to implement a generic IRFN solvency cascade model from the point
of view of someone with access to complete counterparty-counterparty exposure data. Since
such detailed data rarely exists, and is never publicly available, a practical way to gain under-
standing of the IRFN is to follow the above implementation method for simulated network
data. For example, Hurd et al. (2017)[Section 3.2] investigates zero-recovery solvency cas-
cades in a stylized configuration graph random network with three bank types, that mimics
certain characteristics of the US financial network. One can simulate such a model with
N = 4000 banks (roughly the current number of banks in the US), over Nm = 12 months,
and follow the calibration method to match the resulting “synthetic” network data to the
IRFN framework. Since the model of Hurd et al. (2017)[Section 3.2] is much simpler than,
but not a special case of, the IFRN framework, it is of interest to investigate how features
observed in the simple model evolve and change when the new structural elements of the
IRFN framework, such as fractional recovery and random exposures, are included. Such
simulation-based experiments are easily accessible, and certainly merit future investigation
as a testing framework for researchers in systemic risk modelling.
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5 Conclusion
This paper concerns itself only with general definitions, characteristics and properties of the
IRFN cascade framework. Although the framework is designed to address any of a wide
range of systemic risk effects for a wide range of real world financial networks, no attempt is
made here to demonstrate its usefulness in actual specific contexts. It goes without saying
that extensive and detailed numerical explorations of such implementations are needed to
gain evidence that the IRFN method can be a useful and informative guide to understanding
systemic risk. Fundamental questions of an implementation nature such as the accuracy of
the large N approximations, the development of efficient computation schemes, large scale
simulation experiments, and calibration to real network data, are very important but would
amount to an enormous expansion of the scope of this paper, and by necessity are postponed
to future works.
As it stands, this paper provides a number of innovative mathematical ideas. The first
is that the IRFN framework provides a flexible mathematical representation applicable to
real world networks viewed at a suitably coarse grained scale. For example, it can provide
a representation of the global financial network that can be useful in understanding SR
spillovers between countries. Not only is the IRFN framework versatile, it possesses an
underlying mathematical structure called the “locally tree-like independence property” that
means large N asymptotic formulas for the network can be related to an associated Galton-
Watson branching process. Some of the mathematical details of this type of “percolation
theory” remain conjectural, and open to future research.
A second innovation is the analysis of the EN 2001 default modelling cascade mechanism,
and its generalizations, within the IRFN framework. It is shown that these mechanisms
possess a related kind of LTI property, that in essence unravels the dependence structure of
the sequence of balance sheet random variables arising from the cascade mapping, under the
condition that the skeleton connection graph is a random tree. This property motivates the
large N cascade mapping formulas and fixed point equilibrium condition derived in the paper
that dramatically extend rigorous large N results of Amini et al. (2016) and Detering et al.
(2017), but whose proof remains another open problem for research. As noted in those
works, the biggest conceptual advantage of closed analytical cascade mapping formulas such
as these is to provide measures of resilience of the network that depend only on a reduced
set of relevant model parameters.
A third important contribution is the extension of random financial networks to involve
quite general classes of distributions, such as inhomogeneous random exposures and balance
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sheets. Moreover, the solvency cascade mapping analysis extends naturally in this wider
setting, leading to a remarkably compact formula (30).
Perhaps the key obstacle in systemic risk research is the strategic value and importance
of counterparty data that makes it extremely confidential, to the extent that collaboration
between countries may seem to be impossible. A fourth contribution of the paper, the
calibration method outlined in Section 4, addresses this issue. This method relies only
on aggregated data that is naturally anonymized, which makes shared calibration exercises
possible when implementing a carefully designed global IRFN model.
Future work on the foundations of the IRFN approach, as opposed to the implementation
issues mentioned above, may take several directions. One way to go is to intertwine solvency
shocks with funding liquidity shocks as well as indirect channels of contagion. With two or
more of the channels of systemic risk, the LTI property of the cascade mechanism seems to
fail, complicating the large N limit analysis. Another type of extension is to add node types
for financial institutions such as hedge funds, firms, central clearinghouses, central banks
etc. This can be implemented within the IRFN framework, introducing another dimension
of complexity. A third type of extension will be to make the exposures have the meaning of
cash, collateral and other types of contract.
In a nutshell, this paper provides a flexible and convenient framework with many potential
applications to systemic risk. However, proving the value of the IRFN approach will depend
most heavily on the results that compare cascade simulations to analytic cascade formulas,
for network models calibrated to reflect the properties of real world financial systems.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Under the assumptions, one can show directly that f(x, y) := log(1 +
yg(x, y))] − yg(x, 0) satisfies limy→0 f(x, y) = limy→0 ∂yf(x, y) = 0 and hence by Taylor’s
remainder theorem
f(x, y) =
∫ y
0
(y − v)∂2yf(x, v)dv
One can also show that ∂2yf(x, v) is in L2(I) for each value v ∈ [0, y¯] provided y¯ > 0 is small
enough. Then, by Fubini’s Theorem, for y ∈ [0, y¯]
|| log(1 + yg(x, y))]− g(x, 0)||2 ≤ (
∫ y
0
(y − v)dv)2 max
v∈[0,y¯]
||∂2yf(x, v)||
2 ≤My4
for some constant M , from which the result follows. ⊓⊔
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